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EDITORIAL COMMENT
STANDING TO CHALLENGE HUMAN ENDEAVORS
THAT COULD CHANGE THE CLIMATE
International lawmaking is a time-consuming business when traditional
methods are used. The process is worse than time-consuming when it is
applied to technological change and its effect on the human environment. In
that arena, it has been recognized for quite a while that traditional methods
-treaty making and state practice leading to custom-are simply inade-
quate by themselves.'
One technique for accelerating the adaptation of international law to de-
velopments in the environmental field is the use of "soft" law to promote the
"progressive emergence of general environmental norms and principles." 2
Of course, one source of soft law is the well-placed United Nations General
Assembly resolution.' Procedural, as well as substantive, norms may be de-
veloped with the help of soft law.
In the fall of 1988, the Government of Malta proposed a General Assem-
bly "Declaration proclaiming climate as part of the common heritage of
mankind."4 During negotiations on Malta's proposal, "common heritage"
became "common concern." 5 Presumably, this change reflected a desire to
avoid the politically charged debate over the full implications of "common
heritage," engendered by its use in the deep seabed and outer space con-
texts. In any event, the General Assembly did adopt a resolution on the
See, e.g., Gotlieb, The hnpact of Technology on the Development ofContemporary InternationalLaw,
170 RECUEIL DES COURS 115, 139-41 (1981).
To take an important, recent example of treaty making, the Montreal Protocol [to the
Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer] on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 ILM 1550 (1987), had been overtaken by scientific discovery
by the time it entered into force on January 1, 1989. It provides in Article 2(4) that industrial-
izcd countries are to reduce their annual consumption of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) by June
30, 1999, to 50% of their consumption in 1986. Under Article 5, developing countries have an
extra 10 years to do so. Reacting to alarming scientific findings regarding the depletion of the
ozone layer, 81 nations in May 1989 declared their intent to phase out completely the produc-
tion and consumption of CFCs controlled by the Montreal Protocol not later than 2000. Hel-
sinki Declaration on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, May 2, 1989, 19 ENVTL. POL'Y & L.
137 (1989). See also United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP] Governing Council Res.
15/36, para. 11 (a), in Report of the Governing Council on the work of its fifteenth session, 44
UN GAOR Supp. (No. 25) at 164, 167, UN Doc. A/44/25 (1989).
" Governing Council of the UN Environment Programme, Environmental Perspective to the
Year 2000 and Beyond, in UN Doc. UNEP/GC.14/26, Ann. II, at 34 (1987).
On the concept of "soft law," see especially Baxter, International Law in "Her Infinite Vari-
at," 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 549 (1980).
UN Doc. A/43/241 (1988).
See Malta's draft and revised draft resolutions, UN Docs. A/C.2/43/L.17 and
A/C.2/43/L.17/Rev.1 (1988).
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"Protection of global climate for present and future generations of man-
kind," containing the "common concern" language.6
Specifically, the resolution "[r]ecognizes that climate change is a common
concern of mankind, since climate is an essential condition which sustains life
on earth."7 It goes on to recommend several measures designed to develop
understanding of the causes and effects of climate change and to generate
international measures for climate preservation. The subject is undeniably
an important one. But is the resolution important to the development of
international law on climate change? The answer appears to be that it is, in a
limited sense.
Although the resolution was proposed as a "Declaration," the General
Assembly did not adopt it with that pedigree. In UN practice, a declaration
has a special status. Even though it is formally a resolution with no higher
rank in the Charter than other resolutions, it is regarded as "a formal and
solemn instrument suitable for those occasions when principles considered
to be of special importance are being enunciated."' An ordinary resolution is
presumably less formal or less solemn, or both. Moreover, an ordinary reso-
lution-like the one on climate change-normally uses language less legisla-
tive in form than a declaration would. It typically "calls upon," rather than
"decides." It typically is expressly, as well as technically, recommendatory
(using "should" rather than "shall").
This lack of special status, however, does not strip the resolution on cli-
mate change of all legal significance. Taken as a whole, it may be regarded as
ultrasoft law, but it is somewhere beyond the starting point on the contin-
uum from -nonlaw to true law. It is the product of serious discussions that
produced a consensus in the Second Committee.9 The General Assembly
adopted it by consensus. I0 More to the present point, the key paragraph,
6 GA Res. 43/53 (Dec. 6, 1988).
'Id., para. 1. The "common concern" language is repeated in GA Res. 44/207, Preamble
(Dec. 22, 1989). The NoordwiJk Declaration on Atmospheric Pollution and Climatic Change,
Nov. 7, 1989, says in paragraph 7 that "Climate change is a common concern of mankind."
Int'l Env't Rep., Current Rep. (BNA) 624 (Dec. 13, 1989). The Statement of the Meeting of
Legal and Policy Experts, emanating from a meeting convened by the Government of Canada
in February 1989, says in paragraph A.3 that the atmosphere "constitutes a common resource
of vital interest to mankind." See UN Doc. A/C.2/44/2 (1989), and 19 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 78,
79 (1989).
8 Cable from the UN Office of Legal Affairs (Nov. 16, 1981), 1981 UNJURID. Y.B. 149. The
formulation is based on a Legal Memorandum of the Office of Legal Affairs, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/L.610, quoted in part in 34 UN ESCOR Supp. (No. 8) at 15, UN Doc. E/3616/Rev.1
and E/CN.4/832/Rev.1 (1962).
9 See UN Doc. A/C.2/43/SR.44, at 8-9 (1988); UN Doc. A/43/905, at 5 (1988).
'o See UN Doc. A/43/PV.70, at 66 (1988). There are differing views about the significance
of consensus in the adoption of General Assembly resolutions. CompareJim~nez de Ar~chaga's
discussion, in CHANGE AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING 48-49 (A. Cassese &
J. Weiler eds. 1988) [hereinafter CHANGE AND STABILITY], and Sloan, General Assembly Resolu-
tions Revisited (Forty Years After), 58 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 39, 140 (1987) (stressing the significance
of consensus), with Condorelli, The Role of General Assembly Resolutions, in CHANGE AND STABIL-
ITY, supra, at 37, 42-47, and Delupis, The Legal Value of Recommendations of International Organi-
sations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 47, 54-55 (W. Butler ed.
1987) (noting that consensus texts tend to be watered down). Schwebel, The Effect ofResolutions
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quoted above, does not purport to prescribe conduct. Instead, it serves a
legitimizing function by recognizing climate change to be a common con-
cern of mankind. Its legal significance does not depend on any quasi-
legislative power of the General Assembly; rather, it depends on the strength
of the shared governmental conviction it enunciates and on the inferences
that may properly be drawn from it.
The paragraph is legitimizing in the sense that it recognizes a collective
interest in climate change that presumably extends well beyond the interests
acknowledged at the Stockholm Conference on the Environment in 1972.
The Stockholm Action Plan implied something less than common concern
by calling only for consultation with "other interested States" when activities
posing a risk of appreciable effects on climate were being contemplated or
implemented." Even that limited assertion has influenced the development
of international environmental law, 2 but the collective consciousness re-
garding interrelated climatic effects has been raised since 1972. It has found
expression in the current resolution.' 3
Clearly, if climate change is a matter of "common concern," international
regulation of it is legitimate.' 4 But that still is not saying much. It is not
necessary to identify climate change as a "common concern of mankind" so
as to legitimize, today, the international regulation of a phenomenon inher-
ently capable of transcending national boundaries. We may then ask if the
concept has some additional significance. It would seem that it does. It im-
plies that-whatever states' obligations may be in the area of climate change
-they run erga omnes.'5 Consequently, any state should have standing to
uf ti, UN. General Assembly on Customary International Law, 73 ASIL PROC. 301, 302, 308-09
(1979), warns about false consensus, achieved despite significant reservations harbored by a
minority of states. In such cases, adoption of the resolution is usually followed by statements
expressing the reservations. Only two statements followed the adoption of GA Res. 43/53, one
by the European Community and one by Malta. Both enthusiastically supported the resolution.
UN Doc. A/43/PV.70, at 66-68 (1988).
" Stockholm Action Plan for the Human Environment, Recommendation 70, UN Doc. A/
CONF.48/14 (1972), reprinted in 11 ILM 1421, 1449 (1972).
,2 -Sc, F. KIRGIS, PRIOR CONSULTATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 123-24 (1983).
i" The linkages between climate change and other environmental conditions, including the
possibility that action to correct one environmental threat could have repercussions in other
environmental areas, appear in the Report on the Villach Conference of the World Climate
Impact Studies Programme (1985), summarized in UNEP, 1985 Annual Report of the Executive
Director, UN Doc. UNEP/GC.14/2, at 70-71 (1986). A preambular paragraph of GA Res.
43/53 refers to the conclusions of the Villach Conference.
4 A second World Climate Conference will be convened in November 1990. A framework
convention on climate change is being prepared, with the goal of completing it by the time of
the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development. See UN Doc. UNEP/GC.14/26,
at 51 (1987); Noordwijk Declaration, supra note 7, para. 29.
5 The International Court has recognized the principle of obligations erga omnes in the
context of basic human rights, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 ICJ REP'. 15, 23 (Advisory Opinion of May 28); and
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (BeIg. v. Spain) (Second Phase), 1970 ICJ REP.
3, 32 (Judgment of Feb. 5); and in the context of a unilateral undertaking addressed to the
international community, Nuclear Tests (Austl. v.. Fr.; NZ v. Fr.), 1974 ICJ REP. 253, 269 and
457, 474 (Judgments of Dec. 20).
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make representations to any other concerning the latter's climate-affecting
policies or activities, without having to allege that it is uniquely affected.'"
Nor should standing be a problem when a state brings a proceeding in an
international tribunal with jurisdiction to hear a challenge to climate-
affecting conduct. 17 Whether a state could take other unilateral action to
vindicate the common concern, such as reprisals, would depend on whether
it has fulfilled whatever procedural and substantive conditions apply to the
chosen remedy.
18
The law of standing in the context of climate change thus would comple-
ment the law of standing as it is increasingly recognized in relation to the
marine environment beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. The current
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law asserts:
Any significant pollution of the marine environment. . . is of concern
to all states. Any state may complain to the offending state or to an
appropriate international agency against violation of generally accepted
When the Court in Barcelona Traction said that "on the universal level, the instruments which
embody human rights do not confer on States the capacity to protect the victims of infringe-
ments of such rights irrespective of their nationality" (1970 ICJ REP. at 47), it was not denying
the relevance of the erga omnes principle to standing; it was simply observing that universal
human rights instruments have not explicitly conferred standing upon all states parties to
protect the rights of persons of any nationality. But see ILO Constitution, Oct. 9, 1946, Art.
26(1), 62 Stat. 3485, TIAS No. 1868, 15 UNTS 35 (any member state may file a complaint if it
is not satisfied that any other member is securing effective observance of a labor convention
that both have ratified, without having to show harm to itself or its nationals).
Application of the erga omnes principle to locus standi in the context of indiscriminate environ-
mental harm was suggested (as an "apparently radical concept") in Brownlie, A Survey oflnterna-
tional Customary Rules of Environmental Protection, 13 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 179, 183 (1973). But
see the more guarded conclusions on standing by way of an actio popularis, as that term is
generally understood, in B. SMITH, STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT
98 (1988).
16 Recognition that climate change is a common concern of mankind might be thought to
imply standing not only for states, but for individuals as well. As in the case of human rights, it is
individuals who will suffer the consequences if governments fail to meet their obligations. But
the analogy to human rights does not take individuals very far down the road to standing.
Individuals do not yet have international personality in the sense that states do. Foreign offices
will require that complaints from non-nationals be presented by their own governments. There
are currently no international tribunals or other international mechanisms designed to hear
individuals' environmental complaints. Ordinary courts in domestic legal systems are not likely
to treat a General Assembly resolution asserting a common concern as a sufficient basis, in itself,
for an individual's standing to complain about threatened climate change if the complainant is
no more vulnerable to the change than is the general population.
17 In other contexts, standing has been a problem in international tribunals. It was an insur-
mountable problem in Barcelona Traction, supra note 15. That case did not involve any question
of standing to represent common interests. The ICJ's second opinion in the South West Africa
Cases (Ethiopia & Liberia v. S. Afr.), 1966 ICJ REP. 6 (Judgment of July 18), rejected the
standing of two former League of Nations members to assert violations of a League Mandate. It
should not preclude standing in a "common concern" proceeding, even though the Court
observed cryptically that a right of actio popularis "is not known to international law as it stands
at present." 1966 ICJ REP. at 47. The Court was not dealing with a matter explicitly defined by
the international community at that time as a matter of common concern.
1" For a full discussion, see Charney, Third State Remedies in International Law, 10 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 57 (1989).
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international rules and standards for the protection of the marine envi-
ronment by another state or its nationals or ships.'
9
Moreover, in the context of standing, the "common heritage" concept appli-
cable to the deep seabed is indistinguishable from "common concern." The
International Law Commission has provisionally adopted a commentary to
one of its articles on state responsibility asserting that the "common heri-
tage" concept as applied to the deep seabed expresses a collective interest
that may be vindicated by any party to the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea (once it enters into force).2" Although this passage in the Commission's
commentary and the Commission's corresponding draft article refer only to
the standing of states parties to a multilateral convention, the commentary
adds that this does not exclude the development of customary rules to the
same effect.
2 '
Efficiency is likely to be served by recognizing universal state standing in
the context of climate change, so long as the world lacks a functioning inter-
national body with the legal capacity, standing and political will to protect
shared interests in climate stability. Efficiency would be served because the
cost to broadly inclusive interests will have escalated, perhaps incalculably,
by the time any one or a few states could show unique, nonminimal harm to
themselves. Standing to complain without a showing of unique harm would
enable not only a single government, but also several like-minded govern-
ments acting together, to challenge the climate-affecting activity before the
consequences get out of hand. Timely challenge could thus be made,
with the cost of mounting the challenge spread among more than one com-
plainant.
2 2
There is a risk for the unwary in all this. Those who have standing must be
vigilant lest they lose their rights by inaction. If state A asserts, verbally or by
conduct, a right to do something, it is an assertion against all that have a
sufficient interest to complain legitimately. Thus, if "common concern"
"' 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, pt.
VI, Introductory Note, at 101 (1987).
2' Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its thirty-seventh session,
[19851 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, pt. 2 at 1, 27, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1985/Add.1.
"' Id. Of course, standing in one context-the suspension of a multilateral treaty obligation in
response to another party's material breach-would have to take account of Art. 60(2), Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331. If climate change is a
common concern of mankind, a breach of an environmental convention that significantly af-
fects climate might well be subject to the broad grant of standing in Article 60(2)(c).
22 This would not necessarily mean that states not subject to the norm complained of could
join in the challenge. Thus, in the case of treaty norms that do not reflect custom, standing
might be limited to states parties to the treaty plus any intended third-party beneficiaries. The
mere recognition of "common concern" probably would not render all states third-party benefi-
ciaries of all treaty norms dealing with climate. Of course, treaty norms may codify, crystallize
or generate custom. Cf North Sea Continental Shelf (FRG/Den.; FRG/Neth.), 1969 ICJ REP.
4 (Judgment of Feb. 20). The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar.
22, 1985, Art. 2(2)(b), 26 ILM 1529 (1987), requiring appropriate measures to control activi-
ties under contracting parties'jurisdiction that are likely to have adverse effects from modifica-
tion of the ozone layer, may well be in one of the custom-related categories.
1990]
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gives all states standing to complain about prospective climate change any-
where in the world, no state may be heard to say that its failure to object has
legal significance only at the point when special effects of the change on its
own territory become apparent. Of course, some states with standing to
object may do so as surrogates for the others. The point is that if no states
object, or if only a few do so without representing the others, all others might
discover that they have acquiesced in the climate-affecting conduct. That
would bar their complaints against violation of any norm that falls short of
jus cogens.
Realization that rights could be lost might cause governments to formu-
late challenges when the risk of climate change is insufficient to justify
them.2" That may simply be a cost of increased awareness. In any event, the
harm from overzealous complaints legitimized by broadened notions of
standing is likely to be less than the harm from activities that cannot effec-
tively be challenged unless particularized effects on individual states are
apparent.
Despite the hazardsjust mentioned, the recognition of climate change As a
common concern of mankind is to be welcomed. 4 In the long term, the most
efficient mechanism will be an international body functioning on premises
maximally scientific and minimally political, with its own standing to protect
climate stability. Malta's initiative contemplates that eventuality, but it has
also given states a potentially useful instrument in the interim.
FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR.*
23 For discussion of problems inherent in a broad concept of standing, see Charney, supra
note 18, at 86-90.
24 Cf. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, 178 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 199-201
(1982 V), concluding that there are distinct advantages in applying the concept of obligations
erga oynnes to a limited category of principles, including those prohibiting massive pollution of
the atmosphere or the sea. Charney, supra note 18, at 95, concludes that third-state remedies
may be desirable when no directly injured state would have traditional standing-as in the case
of damage to common spaces outside the jurisdiction of any state.
* I am grateful to Michael R. Archie, of the Washington and Lee University School of Law,
for his research help in the preparation of this Editorial Comment.
